By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The first EU–Central Asia Summit took place amid intensifying global competition, emphasizing the EU’s efforts to strengthen ties through connectivity, economic diversification and access to critical raw materials. Key regional concerns—including migration, sanctions circumvention, and infrastructure gaps—were also addressed. There is growing anticipation that the EU will adopt a more holistic and regionally attuned strategy, moving beyond great power rivalry to foster inclusive, long-term partnerships. Such an approach would bolster the EU’s credibility as a constructive and complementary actor in Central Asia’s evolving geopolitical landscape. Instead of competing against Russia and China, the EU can play more effective role as a reliable partner.

Photo source: Framalicious

BACKGROUND: The first EU–Central Asia Summit was held in Uzbekistan on April 4, 2025, in Uzbekistan. The EU was represented by President of the European Council António Costa and Head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. During the summit, multilateral relations were addressed in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner. The parties discussed various areas of cooperation, including security challenges, economic collaboration, connectivity under the Global Gateway framework and people-to-people ties.

The EU holds a distinct position in the region, being Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner and its largest investor, accounting for 22.6 percent of the region’s foreign trade and 40 percent of foreign investments. In particular, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have expressed their intention to further develop trade relations with Europe under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which facilitates more favorable access to the EU market.

This summit is also significant given its timing—coinciding with a period in which the U.S., alongside Russia and China, has emerged as a competitor to the EU in the region. In this new geopolitical landscape, strengthening relations with alternative markets has become a strategic objective for all major actors. However, the EU is expected to adopt a clearer stance on key issues in its evolving engagement with Central Asia. There are growing expectations that the EU will address the unintended negative impacts of its sanctions on Russia, which have also affected the region. Additionally, greater emphasis is expected on areas that align more closely with the region’s pressing needs—such as agricultural development and connectivity infrastructure—rather than focusing narrowly on selected industries or geopolitical competition. 

IMPLICATIONS: The EU’s timely convening of the Central Asia Summit coincided with a period in which global developments are compelling all countries to make new strategic choices. Actors affected by the protectionist U.S. economic policies, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s rapid and seemingly unstoppable economic expansion are increasingly seeking new avenues for cooperation. While the EU already maintains a satisfactory level of economic engagement with the region, this new initiative signals an ambition to address more niche and forward-looking areas. These include specific areas such as geographical and digital connectivity, the green economy, critical raw materials and water management.

Within the Global Gateway initiative, the EU has sought to engage with the region primarily through infrastructure projects, allocating a budget of €300 million for this purpose. Although the EU’s initial intention was, to some extent, to compete with China, it has opted for a more nuanced and tempered approach in recent years. As Dr. Stefan Meister from the German Council on Foreign Relations explains, “EU is not about seriously challenging China and Russia, but rather about offering some alternatives in some sectors, competing in some sectors—especially on raw materials and on connectivity.” This perspective reflects the EU’s new approach of pragmatic engagement rather than direct confrontation, seeking to expand its influence through sector-specific cooperation and strategic investments.

Given China’s geographical proximity and economic leverage, it has become clear that directly confronting Beijing’s dominant position in Central Asia would yield little benefit for any actor involved. Instead, the EU has pursued a strategy of complementarity rather than rivalry. Central Asian countries, positioned to benefit from this geopolitical pragmatism, stand to gain significantly—particularly through the further development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which promises to enhance regional connectivity, linking the EU and Central Asia within 15 days and expanding their access to diversified markets.

In addition, the issue of critical minerals is also of great importance in the new period. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed in March 2023, aims to ensure a secure, sustainable and diversified supply of critical raw materials essential for strategic sectors. As demand for materials like rare earths and especially lithium is projected to increase up to twelvefold by 2030, the EU seeks to reduce its overreliance on single third-country suppliers. The Act sets specific targets: at least 10 percent of the EU’s annual consumption should be extracted within Europe, 40 percent processed, and 25 percent recycled, with no more than 65 percent of any strategic raw material imported from a single external source. These measures are central to the EU’s efforts to diverse partnerships with Central Asia.

Kazakhstan’s substantial uranium reserves and its role as a producer of 19 critical raw materials essential to the EU make it a strategically important partner. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan possess reserves of 43, 17, and 71 critical minerals respectively, further enhancing the region’s value from the EU’s perspective. However, despite this resource richness, the region’s transport connectivity remains heavily influenced by Russia and China—posing a significant challenge for the EU as it seeks to establish independent and secure supply routes.

Migration constitutes a growing challenge in EU–Central Asia relations in addition to the risk of sanctions circumvention and agriculture development limitations. The EU has expressed increasing concern over migration flows originating from or transiting through the region—particularly given instability in Afghanistan and broader socioeconomic pressures within Central Asia. Despite this pragmatic exchange, questions remain about the long-term sustainability and oversight of such processes.

On the other hand, an increasing number of Russian companies are reportedly using Central Asia to circumvent Western sanctions, raising concern within the EU. Russian-affiliated businessmen have begun relocating portions of their assets to countries in the region to shield them from asset freezes, a development the EU views unfavorably. In 2024, several companies were added to the U.S. sanctions list. Additionally, remittances from Russia remain a vital source of income for countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, since the imposition of sanctions, this financial flow has become unstable, posing significant challenges to the economic stability of these remittance-dependent economies. The EU needs to address this issue in the future since there is no specifically designed policy to resolve it.

Lastly, the EU has been slow to support the broader economic development of Central Asia. According to World Bank data, the agriculture sector remains a weak component of total GDP in the region: 4 percent in Kazakhstan, 9 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 11 percent in Turkmenistan, 20 percent in Uzbekistan and 22 percent in Tajikistan. The service sector dominates these economies, accounting for 56 percent in Kazakhstan, 52 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 45 percent in Turkmenistan, 43 percent in Uzbekistan, and 35 percent in Tajikistan. Under these conditions, the EU needs to play an effective role in strengthening the region’s capacity for industrial production and economic diversification. A narrowly focused strategy centered solely on gas, oil, and critical raw materials risks undermining the long-term goals of sustainable and inclusive cooperation.

CONCLUSION: Although EU policy frameworks are often presented with ambitious and appealing labels, critical areas remain that require greater attention in Central Asia. Rather than pursuing selective economic cooperation, the EU should prioritize agricultural development, the diversification of industrial sectors and the provision of sufficient infrastructure support. Moreover, a clear and coherent stance on the indirect impact of sanctions against Russia in the region is urgently needed. These ongoing uncertainties and regional expectations will play a defining role in shaping the future trajectory of EU–Central Asia relations.

On the other hand, framing cooperation with Central Asia solely as a tool for competing with Russia and China is unlikely to yield meaningful benefits for either the EU or the region. A more constructive approach would involve the EU positioning itself as a complementary partner, offering alternatives rather than rivalry. This strategy not only fosters regional stability but also helps mitigate the negative effects of U.S. protectionist tendencies, thereby strengthening the EU’s credibility as a balanced and reliable actor in Central Asia.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.

By Sergey Sukhankin

In early January 2025, operations at the uranium-producing Kazakhstan-based Joint Venture Inkai LLP (JV Inkai) were temporarily halted – the venture, established in the early 1990s, has been jointly managed by Kazatomprom (which holds a 60 percent stake) and the Canadian company Cameco (with 40 percent) – resulting in a brief decline in the share prices of both firms in New York and evident concern among Canadian investors. After a short interruption, activities at Inkai resumed without disruption. This event – though seemingly a minor occurrence that largely escaped the attention of many analysts – reflects broader and more concerning trends (particularly for the West) emerging within the global uranium market, in which Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role.

Photo source: NAC Kazatomprom JSC

BACKGROUND: The strategic significance of uranium extends well beyond its military applications. The rapidly increasing global interest in nuclear energy—among both economically advanced and developing countries—is contributing to uranium’s emergence as a commodity of critical strategic value. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in addition to the existing 420 nuclear reactors worldwide, 63 new reactors are currently under construction, and the operational lifespan of a further 60 reactors is being extended. As a result, uranium's importance is projected to grow steadily in the years ahead. The present and future stability of the global nuclear energy sector is therefore highly contingent upon reliable access to substantial, readily extractable uranium reserves located in politically stable and predictable nations. It is precisely in this context, however, that significant challenges begin to surface.

Following the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Western access to two critical sources of both enriched and unenriched uranium has been partially obstructed. U.S. sanctions targeting Russian uranium have jeopardized U.S. access to this supply, while geopolitical instability—marked by a pronounced anti-Western orientation—in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, has effectively severed France’s access to locally sourced unenriched uranium. Exacerbating this situation, other major African uranium producers, including Namibia and Tanzania, are increasingly inclined to cooperate with Russia and China in uranium extraction activities. This emerging alignment places them in growing opposition to Western companies and their strategic interests.

At present, the already limited list of geopolitically stable, world-class uranium-producing nations has effectively narrowed to just three: Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia. Among them, Kazakhstan stands as the global leader in the production of unenriched uranium, accounting for over 40 percent of total global output, and ranks as the second-largest country in terms of uranium reserves.

The primary concern lies in the fact that, despite its considerable wealth in natural resources, Kazakhstan is unable to fully leverage its vast resource potential. The country remains heavily dependent on two dominant geopolitical actors—Russia and China—both of which exert significant influence over the direction and development of Kazakhstan’s uranium-producing sector. Most critically, these two states maintain increasingly strained relations with the West.

Consequently, certain Kazakhstan-based analysts have voiced suspicions that the underlying cause of the operational halt at Inkai was pressure exerted by Russia, allegedly in response to Kazakhstan’s post-2022 efforts to alter the logistics of its uranium exports by decreasing reliance on Russian transit routes and instead utilizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor) as an alternative to exporting uranium through Russian territory.

IMPLICATIONS: The global uranium industry is currently characterized by rapidly increasing demand alongside growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of supply, driven largely by global and regional geopolitical disruptions. Within this context, Kazakhstan’s role as a resource-rich and historically stable supplier of uranium has acquired a qualitatively new significance. Notably, Kazakh authorities have publicly committed to boosting uranium production in 2025 and to diversifying both their export destinations and logistical routes, aiming to reduce the country's reliance on Russia. Nevertheless, the “Inkai incident”—which allegedly represents only the visible portion of deeper structural dynamics affecting Kazakhstan’s uranium sector—raises three key concerns.

First, can Kazakhstan successfully restructure its existing logistical routes and thereby reduce its strategic dependence on Russia? On the surface, such a shift appears feasible. According to statistics provided by Kazakh authorities, the country has made tangible progress in increasing uranium shipments through the Middle Corridor. Available data indicate that approximately 64 percent of West-bound uranium exports are now transported via this route. Moreover, Kazakhstan has also expanded its uranium exports to Western markets, with shipments destined for the United States gaining particular prominence.

The reality, however, appears significantly more complex. Despite recent efforts to diversify transit routes, a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports continues to be transported through Russian territory. Furthermore, Russia’s state-owned corporation Rosatom maintains (in)direct control over at least five of Kazakhstan’s fourteen major uranium production sites, reinforcing Russia’s strategic influence over the sector. In addition, the Middle Corridor presents notable challenges. Geopolitically, Georgia—an essential transit country along the route—occupies a critical position, and its political leadership has demonstrated increasing alignment with Moscow, potentially complicating matters should Russo-Western relations further deteriorate. From a logistical standpoint, representatives of the Canadian firm Cameco have expressed concerns, stating that the Middle Corridor “has proven to be neither reliable nor predictable,” due to the complex network of countries traversed and the numerous permits required for transit.

Compounding these challenges is the apparent ambivalence within Kazakhstan regarding the exclusion of Russia from its current uranium transportation framework. Specifically, Kazakh officials have indicated that the country does not intend to significantly expand the use of the Middle Corridor for uranium exports. Additionally, many Kazakhstan-based experts express skepticism about any prospective reduction in cooperation with Rosatom (i.e., Russia). On the contrary, a prevailing view among these analysts is that bilateral collaboration in the uranium sector is likely to deepen in the future.

Second, what is the actual role of China in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry and how will this role evolve? At present, China is the world’s second-largest consumer of uranium, following the United States, and its demand is expected to continue rising. Kazakhstan serves as China’s primary source of uranium: according to several studies, over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium output is currently exported to China, with some estimates suggesting this figure may be as high as 60 percent. This situation, as noted by representatives of major Western uranium-related enterprises, “raises concerns about reduced availability for Western markets, potentially exacerbating global supply constraints,” a challenge that is already beginning to manifest within the industry.

Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian side transferred its shares in uranium-producing sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterparts. At present, there is no consensus among experts regarding China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is considered a relatively depleted and comparatively minor uranium production site.
While some analysts contend that the acquisition primarily serves China’s geoeconomic objectives—particularly in light of projections indicating a substantial increase in the country’s uranium consumption over the coming years—others emphasize a more overtly geopolitical dimension to China’s actions. Notably, Stanislav Pritchin of the Central Asia Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has drawn attention to China’s established practice of acquiring “unpromising” oil and natural gas deposits. In his view, such acquisitions function as instruments for expanding China’s strategic presence within the host country.

Third, what is the future role of Western companies in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry? Given that neither China nor Russia appears willing to reduce their involvement in the sector—thereby sustaining Kazakhstan’s strategic dependency on both actors—serious concerns have emerged regarding the potential marginalization or even eventual withdrawal of Western firms from the country’s uranium landscape. Indeed, some Kazakhstan-based experts have implicitly acknowledged a widely discussed notion circulating in Western policy and business circles: the ongoing bifurcation of the global uranium industry. This refers to the emergence of a distinct segmentation of uranium supply chains along geopolitical lines, with one stream aligned with the West and the other with the China-led bloc. Within this context, it is feared that Kazakhstan may ultimately be compelled to align more closely with the latter and reduce its cooperation with Western partners accordingly.

Undoubtedly, such a scenario would only be likely to materialize in the event of a further deterioration in political and economic relations between China (and, under certain conditions, Russia) and their Western counterparts. While this scenario remains hypothetical at present, it is by no means implausible.

CONCLUSION: Although Kazakhstan and its political leadership have expressed strong interest in expanding foreign—particularly Western—participation in the country’s uranium industry, the influence of external geopolitical dynamics cannot be overlooked. As uranium increasingly assumes a role in the global energy mix comparable to that historically occupied by fossil fuels, the issue of access to and supply of this resource has transcended purely economic considerations and has firmly entered the realm of geopolitics.

In light of the intensifying geopolitical competition between East and West over access to emerging markets and spheres of influence, it is conceivable that China and its strategic partners may seek to curtail Western access to Kazakhstan-based uranium—mirroring developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Western firms are increasingly being displaced from uranium-related ventures. To avert a potential supply shock—akin to that experienced in the oil and natural gas sector following Russia’s attempt, in the aftermath of February 2022, to weaponize hydrocarbon exports as a means of exerting geopolitical pressure on the West—it is imperative that Western companies (and, arguably, governments) begin to explore alternative uranium sources to sustain their nuclear energy agendas. Given the small number of globally significant suppliers, increased attention should be directed toward Canada and Australia, which possess substantial uranium reserves and are regarded as geopolitically stable and reliable partners.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).     

S. Frederick Starr

April 3, 2025

This article is an English version of an article to appear in Uzbek in Vatan (Motherland), Uzbekistan's leading journal.

Read Uzbekistan and the Institutionalization of Greater Central Asia PDF

S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

Nargiza Umarova

March 12, 2025

In the current geopolitical realities, Central Asia seeks to restore its historical role as a land-based transportation and logistics hub, facilitating connections between East and West, as well as North and South. Most of the region’s countries promote their own projects including railways, gas pipelines, and power lines through Afghanistan, which offer them substantial economic and geopolitical advantages. However, the intervention of major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Iran, could create a serious conflict of interest on the trans-Afghan track. To mitigate risks, Central Asian states should implement a coordinated policy for developing the southern transit direction on a mutually beneficial basis.

Read What the Extension of Transport Corridors in Afghanistan Means for Central Asia (PDF)